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Introduction
Within a globalized economy, changes of job tasks are frequent and tend to become an 
integrate part of everyone’s working life. Continuous training was found to be a promising 
possibility to deal with the challenges of a changing work environment (Van Loo et al. 2001). 
Employers play an important role as sponsor of training. More than 80% of employees’ 
training was (co-)financed by firms by bearing direct costs of training or by sponsoring 
training during work hours (Pischke 2001). In 2005, German firms that invested in training 
spent on average 651 Euro per employee for further training courses (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2007). Productivity increases after training are large which is an indicator of high training 
returns for firms. For instance, Dearden et al. (2006) find that raising the fraction of trained 
workers by 1% point is associated with a 0.6% increase in productivity. Using German data, 
Zwick (2006) confirms a relationship between training intensity and establishment 
productivity in similar magnitude.  
Given the importance of firms’ engagement in continuous training, there is still little known 
on training incentives and cost sharing between workers and firms, although a variety of 
training theories were established, most notably the human capital theory (Becker 1964) and 
theories of wage compression (Katz and Ziderman 1990, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). 
Recently, Gersbach and Schmutzler (2006), henceforth GS, expanded the training literature 
by presenting a new theoretical model. Their model emphasizes the role of imperfect product 
markets as a new aspect determining firms’ training decisions. This paper makes a first 
attempt of testing this model empirically.  
In the model of GS, training is assumed to be transferable within industries and to have a 
positive but decreasing effect on firms’ productivity. Product markets are characterized by 
imperfect competition which implies own profits to depend negatively on the productivity of 
one’s competitors. Therefore, the productive value of every trained worker can differ between 
but also within firms, because it depends on the number of trained workers at one’s own firm 
and on the number of workers trained by the competitor. Thus, wages for workers with similar 
training attendance might vary within but also between firms. In highly competitive markets, 
the incentives to poach increase because hiring a competitors’ trained employees translates 
into higher rents by the twofold effect of weakening the competitor and by obtaining a 
trained, more productive worker. Hence, there should be a negative effect of product market 
competition on firms’ training investments.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the direct effect of product 
market competition on employer-financed further training.
1 Thereby, it provides an empirical 
test of the training theory of GS. To the best of our knowledge there are no previous studies 
evaluating the effect of market concentration on further training. Furthermore, the empirical 
analysis also expands the literature on the effects of competition. It is well known that intense 
competition can have a positive effect on investments and technological innovations (Scherer 
1967, Aghion et al. 2004) and accelerate productivity growth (Aghion et al. 2005, 
Januszewski et al. 1999). However, the effect of competition on human capital accumulation 
is fairly unexplored, although this information could be helpful for policymakers to foster and 
influence competition and/or training policies.  
                                                
1 We focus solely on further training and do not consider apprenticeship training. This is because the reasons to 
provide apprenticeships are manifold. In theories such as wage compression (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998) and 
screening (Spence 1973) training only pays off when the apprenticeship was completed and some graduates were 
retained. During the period of apprenticeship training firms bear net expenses. There is evidence that apprentices 
can enhance productivity (Wolter et al. 2006), however, this does not apply to all firms. 5
For the empirical investigation, the IAB Establishment Panel, that contains information on 
training decisions in addition to a variety of establishment attributes, is augmented with the 
Herfindahl Index at the 3-digit industry level and the number of firms at the 3-digit industry 
level. All firms acting in the same industry are regarded as competitors. The Herfindahl Index 
is a proxy for product market competition that is commonly used in empirical evaluations.
2
The number of firms was used less often in previous work.
3 The Herfindahl Index is available 
for the manufacturing sector only. For reasons of comparability, all other regressions are also 
restricted to manufacturing firms. It will be explored, how these measures of competition 
affect training incidence, i.e. the decision of firms to train or not, and training intensity, i.e. 
how many workers participate in training. The chosen estimation strategy controls for 
unobserved time-invariant effects such as the ability of the work force and its capability to 
acquire new knowledge or managerial ability. Using measures of competition merged at the 
3-digit industry level has some shortcomings as it may not reflect all aspects of competition 
which is because international competition is ignored. We therefore analyze also the impact of 
the price cost margin on training decisions.  
Our results show that there is no statistically significant effect of any of our measures of 
competition on training incidence or intensity after controlling for unobserved time-invariant 
effects for German establishments in the manufacturing sector. These results hold even after 
applying a variety of sensitivity checks such as using different samples and regression 
specifications.  
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The second section describes the theoretical 
models and previous literature. The next section presents the data and summary statistics. 
Afterwards, the empirical framework is specified and estimation results as well as sensitivity 
analysis are presented. The last section provides some conclusions.  
Theoretical Background and Previous Literature 
Gary Becker (1964) established the first training theory within the framework of the human 
capital theory. It is assumed that training enhances worker’s productivity and that two types of 
training can be distinguished that differ in terms of transferability after job loss. General 
training will affect workers productivity in all firms whereas specific training is only 
applicable in the firm of acquisition. According to the nature of training, the willingness of 
employers to bear the costs differs. Although this theory first emphasized the role of training 
and embedded it into a theoretical framework, it seems to be at odds with reality seeing that 
firms finance general training activities to a great extent (Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999, 
Pischke 2001). This finding can be explained by another stream of literature that is consistent 
with the empirical evidence. This literature relaxes Becker’s strong assumption of competitive 
labor markets and assumes that labor markets are imperfect. Labor market imperfections such 
as information asymmetries or mobility costs can provide employers with monopsony power 
which can lead to wage compression, i.e. wages are paid below productivity (Katz and 
Ziderman 1990, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). This wage-productivity differential induces 
rents for employers to recoup their training investments. The incentives to train should 
increase in firms with more monopsony power.
4   
                                                
2 See, for example, Levin and Reiss (1988) or Gottschalk and Janz (2001) for an application to analyze the 
impact of market concentration on innovation activities. 
3 For an application see Kraft (1989). 
4 For a survey of recent theoretical and empirical contributions to the training literature see Asplund (2004) or 
Leuven (2005). 6
The model of Gersbach and Schmutzler (2006) expands the previous training literature by 
emphasizing that market concentration could also be of importance for firms’ decisions to 
train. In particular, imperfect product markets could lead to investments in industry-specific 
training which is of general nature as it is transferable between firms within industries. Their 
model predicts a negative impact of product market competition on training.  
GS set up a three stage game where firms in the first step decide on the number of workers 
trained which involves sunk costs for every trained employee. In the second stage, a wage 
bidding-game takes place, i.e. the level of wages is set determining the extent of employees’ 
poaching and turnover. Workers choose their employer according to the highest wage offer. A 
worker stays at the firm where he or she was trained if two firms make the same wage offer. 
In the final stage, oligopolistic competition at product markets takes place.  
In the model of GS it is assumed that training investments enhance labor productivity, e.g. 
because they help to adopt worker’s knowledge faster to new technologies or enhance product 
quality. For this reason, a firm’s gross profits, which are defined as profits excluding training 
costs and wages, are positively affected by training. Gross profits do not depend on whether 
the firm’s employees were trained by itself or by the competitor since training is assumed to 
impart industry-specific knowledge only. A crucial assumption, that leads the wage-bidding 
game to an equal distribution of workers across firms and to multiple equilibria, is that the 
marginal productivity of a trained worker is a decreasing function of the number of trained 
employees in the market. This implies that a firm’s marginal valuation of a trained employee 
and hence the wage offer decreases with the number of trained workers. GS argue that it is 
plausible that wages decline with training intensity because of competition between trained 
workers within an industry.  
The marginal effect of training an additional worker on net profits consists of the direct effect 
through increased productivity, an indirect effect because it decreases competitors’ profits, the 
decreasing wage effect on other trained workers and the training costs plus the increased wage 
costs for the trained worker. Training only takes place if the effect of own training on workers 
is sufficiently strong to overturn the additional costs. Wages are high when the marginal 
valuation of poaching a worker is high. Since the marginal effect of poaching is the highest if 
products are close substitutes, GS argue that strong competition, i.e. strong substitutability 
between products, reduces training incentives. The model also implies that an increase in 
market size increases the incentives to train, because productivity enhancing investments 
apply to a larger potential output. Although the case of more than two competitors is not 
explicitly analyzed, GS argue that for a given market size the number of competitors should 
decrease the incentives to train, because the effect of training a worker on wages will be small 
if there are many firms. The hypothesis that increased competition, e.g. by an increasing 
number of competitors, decreases employers’ training investments will be tested empirically. 7
Data and Summary Statistics
The German Establishment Panel
5 is an annual survey that is conducted by the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) in Nuremburg and covers the years 1993 to 2005. East German 
establishments are surveyed since 1996. The panel study is representative for all German 
establishments having at least one employee covered by social security systems, which refers 
to 80% of the German work force. Holding companies and subsidiaries are regarded as single 
firms in the Establishment Panel as the unit of surveying is the establishment and not the 
enterprise. The core topics of the questionnaire cover the skill structure of the workforce, 
employment fluctuations, collective pay commitments, sales, general investments and also 
investments in human capital.  
For the analysis, we extract an unbalanced panel from the Establishment Panel for the years 
2001, 2003 and 2005. The focus on this relatively short time horizon is caused by 
modifications of the industry classification in the Establishment Panel in 2000 due to changes 
in the standard national industry classification. Comparability of the industry classification 
with waves before 2000 is limited to analyses using the 1- or 2-digit code only. For our 
analysis, information at the 3-digit industry level is necessary in order to merge information 
on competition. The main analysis is restricted to manufacturing industries because 
manufacturing establishments are more homogenous than establishments in the service sector. 
Moreover, some of the variables for competition are only available for manufacturing firms. 
A detailed description of the variables and corresponding sample statistics of the main sample 
is provided in Table A- 1 in the Appendix. There are 12125 observations in the final sample.  
In a regular two-year cycle starting in 1993 detailed questions on training investments with a 
reference period of the last six months are asked. Establishments report whether they have 
contributed financially to employee’s training (either by covering direct costs of training and/ 
or by providing training during working hours) and how many workers participated in 
training
6. Overall, 63% of the establishments in our data report to have undertaken training 
investments which corresponds to 36% in Germany when taking oversampling of large 
establishments into consideration.  
Training activities vary substantially between establishments of the manufacturing sector. 
Figure 1 contains the average percentage of training establishments in 2005 and the average 
number of trained workers separately by industry measured at the 2-digit level. The average 
number of establishments sponsoring training ranges from 20 to more than 60 percent. These 
differences might reflect different market concentration but they could also be explained by 
differences in technological intensity. While only 20% of establishments in low-tech 
industries such as paper and wood products invest in employer-sponsored training, training 
incidence and intensity is more than three times larger for establishments that produce 
knowledge-intensive products such as chemicals, motor vehicles and transportation 
equipment. 
                                                
5 See Bellmann (2002) for a more detailed description of the data and Alda et al. (2006) for generating the data.  
6 Establishments have to chose, if they report the number of training participants as the number of individuals 
that took part in training (employees’ participation) or as the overall number of participants that also 
encompasses repeated participation of a single worker (number of training attendances). Because approximately 
80% of firms report employees’ participation rates, we chose to use this number as a measure of training 
intensity. 8
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Notes: The average values are weighted with the weighting factors 
provided in the data.  
The Establishment Panel was merged at the 3-digit industry level
7 with the Herfindahl– 
Hirshman Index (HHI) that is provided by the monopoly commission (Monopolkommission 
2003, 2004, 2006). The Herfindahl Index is defined as the sum of squared market shares of all 
firms operating in the 3-digit industry.
8 The HHI is regarded as an appropriate indicator for 
product market competition because it takes into account the entire distribution of 
competitors’ market shares within an industry and not only the number of competitors a firm 
faces. Further, it is the standard measure of market concentration in the empirical industrial 
organization literature and is commonly used to account for market concentration in 
innovation studies.
9 Nevertheless, using the HHI is also associated with some shortcomings. 
For example, it is only available for the manufacturing sector and it is measured with a one-
year lag. Small values for the HHI refer to intense competition and a high value indicates that 
competition is weak. The HHI is usually bounded between  n / 1  and 1 where n denotes the 
number of firms per industry. As we multiply the HHI with 100, the boundaries changed to a 
minimum of 100*( n / 1 ) and a maximum of 100. The HHI is available for the years 1999, 
2001 and 2003. For every year, the HHI could be merged for roughly 100 industries.  
To check the robustness of our results, a second proxy for competition is calculated and 
merged at the 3-digit industry level to the Establishment Panel. In particular, we use the 
number of competitors per industry obtained from the German Umsatzsteuerstatistik (statistic 
on value-added tax)
10 that is provided by the Federal Statistical Office. The number of 
competitors operating in each industry (NOF) represents a direct measure of competition. 
                                                
7 In the Establishment Panel, the 3-digit industry classification refers to the WZ 1993 code for 2001 and 2003 
and to the WZ 2003 code for 2005. The WZ 2003 is equivalent to NACE Rev 1.1.  









i i j a a HHI
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where  i a  measures firm i ’s sales and  j  is an industry identifier. 
For the calculation of the Herfindahl Index the German monopoly commission takes into account all firms with 
at least 20 employees.  
9 See Cohen and Levine (1989) for a survey on innovation and market structure. 
10 The Umsatzsteuerstatistik contains information aggregated on 3-digit NACE Rev 1.1. industry level on the 
total amount of firms as well as on total sales generated in Germany that are liable to the German value-added 
tax. This encompasses all firms with annual sales above 17500 € . 9
Using merely NOF as a measure of competition could be misleading. For instance, the 
abolition of trade barriers could increase the size of the market and the number of firms 
operating in these markets at the same time. Without keeping the size of the market constant, 
it is ceteris paribus not clear, if competition increases or decreases. Therefore, we inserted in 
addition to NOF the total sales of firm’s competitors (SAL) which we calculated as industry-
specific sales minus firm-specific sales. Both variables are measured in logarithms. Hence, 
changes of NOF within an industry across time are equivalent to net entry rates and changes 
of SAL within an industry across time are equivalent to a market’s growth rate. Since 1999, 
NOF and SAL are available on an annual basis for all industries.  
The disadvantage of using a proxy at the industry level is that it relies on a good 
approximation of markets by the industrial classification and that it only takes into account 
domestic competition. To reply to these objections, the Lerner Index representing firms’ price 
cost-margins is used as a second alternative measure of competitive pressure.
11 Price cost 
margins reflect a mark-up over firms’ marginal costs. In the case of perfect competition price 
cost margins should be zero, while they increase with market concentration. The price cost 









where value added is computed as sales minus intermediate inputs. The price cost margin can 
be calculated with the Establishment Panel for every year and was multiplied with 100 to 
represent percentage points. The Lerner Index is clearly affected by endogeneity problems 
because firms’ profits are affected by training and other productivity enhancing investments. 
In our data set, there is no suitable external instrument to deal with this problem. These 
shortcomings have to be considered when interpreting the results. Specifically, the estimated 
effect of the price cost margin on training does not have a causal interpretation and should 
thus rather be seen as a robustness check.  
Competition and training might be quasi-fixed factors when related to a short time series, i.e. 
they do not vary across time. However, variation of these variables across time is necessary 
for estimation. To check if there is enough variation, we calculated deviations of the 
Herfindahl Index, NOF, the price cost margin and training outcomes from their previous 
values within each firm. 26% (of 5075 deviations) of the Herfindahl Index are at least 0.5, 
38% of the deviations of NOF exceed a change of the number of firms of at least 5% (overall, 
the deviations are reported for 5346 observations) and 53% of deviations (of a total of 4140) 
of the price cost margin are larger or equal to 10. Furthermore, the binary training variable 
changes in 22% and there are changes of the number of trained workers larger or equal to 1 
for 64%. In conclusion, there appears to be substantial variation of all of the three measures of 
competition and training outcomes across time. 
Empirical Framework 
This paper aims at exploring the direct effect of product market competition on firms’ 
decision to contribute financially to training. Two different variables that represent firms’ 
training activities are regressed on the same set of explanatory variables. The explanatory 
variables comprise a measure for product market competition and additional controls. The 
following empirical model is specified: 
                                                
11 The Lerner Index was first proposed by Collins and Preston (1969). See Czarnitki and Kraft (2005) for a 
recent application. 10
( ' )          =1,2;  =1,..N;  =1,...J;  =1,...T
k
ijt ijt TF C X k i j t γ =+               (1) 
1 T  denotes a binary variable for training incidence of establishment i in industry  j  at time 
t. Particularly, firms are asked in the survey whether they engaged in training either by 
bearing direct costs for training or by releasing employees from work in the first half of year 
t. Secondly, 
2 T  represents training intensity, i.e. the number of trained employees per firm. 
Considering two different outcomes enables us to discover the impact of competition on 
training investments in more than one dimension. The chosen training variables include 
investments in further training but exclude human capital activities within the framework of 
the German apprenticeship system. This exclusion is due to the heterogeneous nature of 
apprenticeship training and its returns. 
Training is specified as a function of product market competition C . Because we use three 
different proxies for competition in order to check the robustness of our results, the regression 
analyses of (1) will be estimated three times for training incidence and three times for training 
intensity. The indices of C  differ between the competition measures because they are 
measured at different units in different time periods.  2 jt C − is the competition indicator for the 
Herfindahl,  1 jt C −  is the indicator for the number of firms and with  1 ijt C −  is the indicator for 
the price cost margin. To avoid simultaneity bias, training information always refers to the 
year  t which prevents that competition and training are measured in the same time period. 
NOF and SAL are included in logarithmic form.  
The vector  X  contains a variety of control variables accounting for observable heterogeneity 
at the establishment level. The percentage of sales generated in international markets is 
incorporated as control variable. This variable considers that the export intensity differs 
between industries and that the measures for competition merged at the 3-digit level disregard 
international competition. Export activity could also represent an indicator for competitive 
pressure, since competition intensity might differ between domestic and international markets. 
However, it is not clear if a higher export share represents more or less competition. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that exporting firms face intense competition because they have to 
overcome higher transport costs compared to firms that operate solely on the domestic market 
as well as sunk costs
12 that arise when a foreign market is entered (Roberts and Tybout 1997). 
On the contrary, firms acting in international markets might also have more differentiated 
products in order to escape intense competition (Skaksen and Munch 2006). Nevertheless, a 
correlation between export activity and training could also be unrelated to market 
concentration. For instance, export firms are on average more productive than firms that 
operate solely on the domestic market and foreign market entry often follows an increase in 
firm performance (Arnold and Hussinger 2005).  
As additional control variables, investments in ICT (information- and communication 
technologies), real estate, machines, transport systems and the current state of technical 
equipment are introduced. These variables represent amongst other things the adoption of 
technological change at the establishment level. Human capital is a key factor to adopt 
technological change because it is essential for the work force to learn how to use recent 
technologies (Fabiani et al. 2005). Several empirical studies confirm a strong and positive 
association between ICT and employer-provided training (Bresnahan et. al 2002, Hempell 
2003).  
                                                
12 Sunk costs may consist of expenditures for logistics, distribution networks, market research or product 
customization. 11
Furthermore, the skill level of the work force is correlated with company training (Lynch and 
Black 1998). This could be because high-skilled workers might be more willing and able to 
adopt new skills since their costs of learning might be lower. Therefore, we use the fraction of 
skilled white collar workers (employees receiving apprenticeship or university degree) and the 
fraction of skilled blue collar workers (workers with apprenticeship degree) as additional 
control variables.  
Apprenticeship training was often found to be positively correlated with further training 
investments (Gerlach and Jirhahn 2001). An explanation for this correlation may be that firms 
invest in human capital (e.g. in apprenticeship and further training) to react to skill gaps. It 
could also be that apprenticeship firms have already borne sunk costs for the training facility 
(e.g. for class rooms).  
Moreover, binary variables for the existence of a collective wage agreement and a work 
council enter the regression. Especially collective wage agreements can increase the 
monopsony power of employers. Monopsony power can lead to wage compression when 
labor markets are imperfect which makes it easier for employers to recoup their training 
investments and therefore increase the incentives to train for employers. The empirical 
evidence for Germany confirms a positive relationship (Gerlach and Jirhahn 2001, Dustman 
and Schoenberg 2004, Zwick 2004).  
Since the Establishment Panel surveys establishments and not single firms, some variables are 
generated to allow for the distinction between headquarters, subsidiaries and independent 
firms. Each regression contains a dummy variable for West Germany that captures regional 
differences and variables for size, industry and year.  
Training incidence is a binary variable that will be analyzed within the framework of a 
discrete choice model. The following observation rule applies:  
βγ α ε ⎧ =+ + + > ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
1* 1 1 1 1
1 1, if ' 0
0, else
ijt ijt i ijt
ijt
TC X
T                                                                           (2) 
1
i α  represents a firm-specific time-invariant effect and ε
1
ijt  is an idiosyncratic error term. The 
firm-specific effect captures unobservable, time-invariant characteristics that are likely to be 
correlated with both product market competition but also with training. For instance, the firm-
specific effect could represent the willingness and ability of the work force to acquire new 
knowledge. It is a well-known fact that ability plays an important role for individual training 
participation and firms that act in competitive markets probably search for workers with 
higher ability (that is unobserved in the data). The time-invariant effect could also represent 
differences of the production technologies or management quality. If unobservable 
characteristics are indeed correlated with training and competition, disregarding these 
characteristics could cause a spurious correlation between competition and training with no 
causal interpretation. Therefore, we consider it as necessary to incorporate unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity for the estimation by utilizing the longitudinal nature of the data.  
Equation (2) will be estimated by a Probit model, which assumes that 
1
ijt ε  is normally 
distributed with constant variance.  ijt C  and  ijt X  are assumed to be strictly exogenous 
conditional on firm-specific effects. This implies that  ,, (1 | ) (1 | ) it ijt ijt it ij ij PT C X PT C X == =
where  ij C and  ij X  contain observations for all time periods. Unfortunately, estimating  i α
along with the slope coefficients yields inconsistent estimates of all parameters. Hence, we 
have to specify a conditional distribution for the firm-specific effects to allow for a correlation 12
between  i α  and  ijt C  and  ijt X . We use Chamberlain’s random effects Probit model 
(Chamberlain 1980) which assumes that 
1 ( |, ) ii j ij XC α ~ 1
'2
01 2 ( , )
ij ij a NX C ςς ς σ ++  where  ij X
and  ij C  denote the mean variables for each firm across time.  
The averages of the regressors across time are included in the regression model as additional 
control variables. Estimation can be carried out by a traditional random effects Probit model 
or by a pooled Probit model. The pooled Probit model is advantageous because it does not 
assume independence of observations across time (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002) as it has to be 
assumed when using the random effects model. Independence of observations may be violated 
if unobservable firm-specific shocks persist over time. The preferred estimation technique is 
therefore the pooled Probit model that includes in addition to the control variables in vector 
X  the means of all regressors (except for size, industry and whether the firm is a headquarter, 
subsidiary or independent firm).
13 Using the pooled estimator comes at the cost of a loss in 
efficiency compared to the random effects model (if the assumptions of the random effects 
model hold). Therefore, we will compare the results when using the random effects Probit 
model instead of the pooled model. In addition, a Probit model without incorporating time-
invariant effects will be estimated as baseline specification and compared with the results of 
the preferred specification. This yields further insights into the importance of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
When analyzing training intensity as outcome, censoring will be taken into account by using 
a Tobit model (Tobin 1958). Censoring occurs because a substantial amount of firms is not 
engaged in training. 
βγ α ε ⎧ =+ + + > ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
2* 2* 2 2 2 2
2 ,if ' 0
0, else
ijt ijt ijt i ijt
ijt
TT C X
T                                                                      (3) 
Again, there is a firm-specific effect 
2
i α and 
2
ijt ε  denotes a normally distributed error term. The 
Tobit model imposes the assumption that the decision to train and the decision on the number 
of participants underlie the same mechanism. Since sign and significance of most of the 
regressors are similar in the Probit and the Tobit model in our empirical results, we conclude 
that this assumption is not violated. Because of the nonlinearity of the Tobit model, estimating 
2
i α  would be computationally demanding and yields a biased estimate of the disturbance 
variance (Greene 2004). Thus, we have to specify a conditional distribution for the firm-
specific effects. Analogous to the Probit model, a Chamberlain-like random effects Tobit 
model will be used which can be implemented by adding firm-specific mean variables of all 
time-varying regressors to the model (Wooldridge 2002). Again, we include firm-specific 
mean variables and run both a pooled estimator that is the main specification and a random 
effects model to check the sensitivity of our results. Furthermore, a Tobit model without 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity reveals information on the prevalence of 
endogeneity problems in this more restrictive specification.  
                                                
13 To check whether our results are sensitive to the distributional assumption of the firm-specific effects, we also 
estimate the equation for training incidence with a fixed effects Logit model and a Linear Probability model with 
fixed effects. Though these models are not restrictive in terms of the distributional assumption, they are 
restrictive in other respects. The fixed effects Logit model only incorporate firms with a change of their training 
behavior and the competition measure and assumes independence across firms. The linear probability model has 
the disadvantage that the predicted probabilities are not bounded between 0 and 1 and can yield quite imprecise 
estimates. 13
When regressing aggregate variables like the Herfindahl Index on firm-level training data, 
standard errors can be biased downwards (Moulton 1990). This is because firms of the same 
industry might be affected by unobserved industry-specific shocks which can result in 
correlated errors. Therefore, the standard errors are adjusted by clustering standard errors at 
the industry level. By clustering at the industry level, we implicitly control for dependence of 
repeated observations of the same establishment (see e.g. Pepper 2002) since establishment 
clusters are nested into industry clusters. 
Results 
First of all, we present the regressions results for the Herfindahl Index and the number of 
firms and total sales. Table 1 contains regression results without incorporating any control 
variables. There is no statistically significant correlation between the HHI and training 
incidence as well as training intensity. However, the sign of the coefficients for NOF and SAL 
are in line with the predictions of the model of GS: average training investments of 
establishments seem to be lower in highly competitive markets. This correlation could be 
caused by differences between establishments operating in markets with different levels of 
concentration that are also associated with training investments, such as the pace and 
frequency of introducing new technologies. Therefore, control variables are considered in all 
subsequently presented regressions. 
Table 1: Coefficients of Regressions Without Control Variables  
HHI 0.014 5.274
NOF -0.273 *** -63.260 **
SAL 0.305 *** 74.405 **
Control Variables 
Wald  




No No No No
14.81 
11028 9537 10527 9117





1.83 1.64   115.22  
0.003 0.053
-7210.80 -42745.42 -6570.36
Herfindahl Index Number of Firms and 
Total Sales
Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
2 χ
2 χ
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit industry level, are 
shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%. 
Table 2 contains the results for the HHI and NOF/ SAL after controlling for various 
covariates as well as for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Columns one to four 
contain estimation results that do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. There is still no 
effect of the Herfindahl Index. For NOF, there remains a statistical significant association 
between competition and training incidence (but no longer with training intensity) although it 
is weaker compared to the former specification.  
Sign and significance of the control variables are also in accordance with the literature (Lynch 
and Black 1998, Gerlach and Jirhahn 2001, Zwick 2004) and with the expectations presented 
in the previous section. The higher the share of profits generated in international markets the 
higher the probability to train and the higher the number of trained workers. Investment 
activity and new technical equipment are positively associated with training. West German 
establishments and establishments that do not provide apprenticeship training invest on 14
average less in continuous training. The average training intensity in establishments with a 
work council or a collective wage agreement is higher as well as for establishments with a 
higher share of skilled workers.  
After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (see columns 5 to 8 of Table 2), the 
coefficients for NOF/ SAL become also insignificant. This result remains unchanged when 
estimating the relationship between competition and training incidence with the fixed effects 
Logit model and with the linear probability model with fixed effects. Furthermore, the result 
is also not sensitive to the use of the random effects Probit and Tobit model including mean 
variables because the results of NOF become insignificant as well. In addition, the initially 
positive correlation between export activity and training renders also insignificant. On the one 
hand, this could indicate that the result of no effect of competition on training also holds for 
international competition. On the other hand, one should be careful with this interpretation as 
the result could also simply reflect that export establishments have unobservable 
characteristics that are correlated with training. 
Table 2: Coefficients of the Regressions for the Herfindahl Index and NOF/ SAL 
HHI 0.004 2.233 0.023 0.442
NOF -0.047 ** -20.255 -0.027 -3.793
SAL 0.065 *** 29.581 0.159 ** 18.629
Share of Sales with Exports 0.002 ** 0.653 0.002 ** 0.583 0.001 0.615 0.003 0.711
Investments in ICT 0.391 *** 43.884 *** 0.370 *** 39.120 *** 0.240 *** 28.073 *** 0.210 *** 24.474 **
Investments in Real Estate 0.098 ** 35.038 ** 0.090 ** 29.216 ** 0.028 -4.906 0.039 -4.043
Investments in Machines 0.195 *** 23.979 *** 0.192 *** 23.655 *** 0.067 13.203 0.057 12.671
Investments in Logistics 0.115 *** 29.176 ** 0.133 *** 27.870 ** 0.061 2.364 0.085 2.925
Excellent State of Techn.  0.181 *** 28.057 *** 0.200 *** 27.945 ** 0.085 31.456 ** 0.120 24.267
Equipm.
West Germany -0.122 *** -0.785 -0.123 *** -0.859 -0.139 *** -4.927 -0.138 *** -5.883
Apprenticeship 0.276 *** 35.468 *** 0.256 *** 33.864 *** 0.079 6.826 0.034 11.156
Work Council 0.229 *** 25.247 *** 0.221 *** 20.150 ** -0.152 -15.836 -0.129 -11.567
Collective Wage Agreement 0.183 *** 27.510 *** 0.205 *** 29.047 *** -0.012 -0.358 -0.019 -2.414
Fraction of Skilled White 0.690 *** 68.508 *** 0.731 *** 68.330 *** 0.222 51.046 0.112 64.200
Collar Employees
Fraction of Skilled Blue  0.437 *** 55.063 *** 0.468 *** 57.765 ** 0.323 102.894 0.223 120.108
Collar Employees
Firm, Size and Industry Controls
Year Controls
Mean Values for all Variables 
Wald  




Herfindahl Index Number of Firms and 
Total Sales
Tobit
No consideration of unobserved heterogeneity With consideration of unobserved heterogeneity
Herfindahl Index
Probit Probit
Number of Firms and 
Total Sales
Probit, CH Tobit, CH Tobit, CH Probit, CH Tobit
(0.0029) (1.9650) (0.0120) (2.2409)
(0.0216) (11.1094)
(17.0887) (0.0235) (0.0733) (10.2328)
(10.1491) (0.0790)
(0.0010) (0.4156) (0.0011) (0.3483) (0.0024) (0.3149) (0.0028) (0.3897)
(10.2656) (0.0487) (10.7949) (0.0451) (13.9209) (0.0367) (15.3144) (0.0344)
(0.0432) (15.8863) (0.0400) (14.1158) (0.0602) (8.0165) (0.0584) (7.8256)
(0.0402) (8.9086) (0.0386) (8.8648) (0.0554) (7.5419) (0.0534) (7.3735)
(0.0360) (13.3656) (0.0360) (13.2446) (0.0507) (7.4922) (0.0454) (6.8875)
(0.0468) (10.4375) (0.0502) (11.3642) (0.0788) (13.8164) (0.0925) (13.4111)
(0.0431) (5.7923) (0.0454) (6.0029) (0.0420) (5.7912) (0.0449) (5.5144)
(0.0314) (13.7003) (0.0323) (13.0171) (0.0677) (11.5279) (0.0634) (10.5844)
(0.0589) (9.4026) (0.0592) (8.1974) (0.1182) (13.1678) (0.1108) (10.9035)
(0.0342) (8.9399) (0.0342) (9.2838) (0.0890) (10.1935) (0.0954) (10.8001)
(52.0713) (0.1667)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
(21.0779) (0.1025) (21.6542) (0.1572) (64.8697)
(0.0894) (21.0515) (0.0956) (24.9500) (0.1719) (75.2777) (0.1726) (93.8017)
(0.1117)
5585.43  553.32   4318.37   626.01   6394.88   899.28   4934.24 963.11
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-4512.69 -36519.05 -4408.94 -35135.32 -4480.46 -36491.57 -4374.28 -35110.36
0.3265 0.323 0.3313 0.329
10142 8845 9855 8581 10142 8845 9855
No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 χ
2 χ
Notes: The model includes dummy variables with 7 categories for size, 16 categories for industry and 
three binary variables for ‘firm’ indicating if the establishment is a single firm, subsidiary or 
headquarter. Standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit industry level, are shown in parentheses. 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%. 15
The marginal effects of the Probit and Tobit regressions for the specification with and without 
control variables are contained in Table 3. Including control variables reduces the marginal 
effects to a large extent which highlights the necessity to incorporate additional variables. 
Furthermore, this provides some suggestive evidence that competition could have an indirect 
effect on training provision. For example, establishments in highly concentrated markets 
might be more likely to adopt new technologies which could be positively associated with 
training. 
Table 3: Marginal Effects of Regressions With and Without Control Variables 
HHI 0.005 0.002 1.616 0.648
NOF -0.102 *** -0.016 *** -19.100 *** -5.841
SAL 0.114 *** 0.023 22.465 *** 8.5299
Control Variables 
Observations
No Yes No Yes
(4.648) (3.081)
(4.7531) (5.911)
(0.0038) (0.0011) (1.2512) (0.5598)
Tobit
8581





11028 9537 8845 9117
Yes No No Yes
Notes: The model includes the full set of control variables also used in the preceding model. Standard 
errors, clustered at the 3-digit industry level, are shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 
5%. 
Using a measure for competition that is aggregated at the 3-digit industry level can be 
problematic because it does not take international competition into account and its validity as 
a proxy for product market competition critically hinges on a proper classification of markets 
by the NACE codes. This is why we also use the price cost margin as measure for 
competition. The results are presented briefly in Table 4 (full estimation results are contained 
in Table A- 2). Independent of the estimation technique, there is no association between 
market concentration and training.  
Table 4: Coefficients of the Regressions for the Price Cost Margin 
Price Cost Margin -0.001 -0.031 -0.000 0.138
Control Variables
Mean Values for all Variables 
Wald  
Wald    , p-value
Log Pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R-squared
Observations 8853 7716 8853 7716
0.320 0.325
-3975.31 -31972.14 -3946.71 -31950.40
3291.28   487.06  4253.97   797.83
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.0008) (0.1223) (0.0016) (0.2363)
No Yes No Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Price Cost Margin
Probit Probit, CH Tobit Tobit, CH
2 χ
2 χ
Notes: The model includes the full set of control variables also used in the 
preceding model. Standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit industry level, are 
shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%. 
In conclusion, there does not seem to be an effect of competition on training investments of 
German manufacturing establishments. 16
Sensitivity Analysis 
To check the robustness of our results, different samples and estimation specifications were 
utilized and the main regressions were re-estimated. For ease of exposition, we concentrate on 
the Herfindahl Index when presenting the results of the following robustness checks.  
Mergers and acquisitions come along with wide changes of the organizational structure and 
working tasks (Weston et al. 1990). Thus, we consider it as likely that the reasons to train 
might be more heterogeneous for these firms and training intensity might change after 
takeovers. Mergers and acquisitions can also have a large impact on market concentration 
which could affect our results. Therefore, another sample was established by deleting all firms 
that were merged with other establishments or that integrated other establishments. There was 
no change of the main results.  
In the main analysis, it was assumed that the effect of competition on training is homogenous. 
Regardless of firm characteristics such as size and industry, a one unit increase of competition 
was assumed to affect training in the same magnitude in absolute values. The analysis was re-
estimated relaxing this strong assumption for firms of different size and industry. The results 
for firms of different size (classified in three groups: <50, 50 to 99, ≥100) comply with the 
main results. Based on the 3-digit industry classification, knowledge-intense and R&D-
intense industries were differentiated.
14 Regressions were run separately for these industries 
indicating no changes of the results.  
In addition, outliers could be problematic when using the Herfindahl Index. All in all, there 
are about 90 establishment-year observations where the Herfindahl Index exceeds 40 which 
characterize highly concentrated industries. However, excluding these firms did not change 
the results noticeably.  
Due to the differentiation between the measurements of training intensity that was either 
reported as employees’ participation rates or as the number of training attendances, we re-
estimated the Tobit model using training attendances as outcome variable. Comparing these 
results with the results using the number of trained employees indicates no substantial 
changes.  
Finally, the main regressions are re-estimated for the service sector considering observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity.
15 Since the Herfindahl Index is not available for the service 
sectors, Table 5 contains only results for the number of firms and the price cost margin. 
Again, there is no effect of competition on training in the service sector.  
                                                
14 For the classification of knowledge- and R&D- intensive industries see Legler and Frietsch (2007). 
15  Service sectors are defined as NACE two-digit industries 40-92 excluding non-profit organizations.  17





Mean Values for all Variables 
Wald  
Wald    , p-value
Log Pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R-squared
Observations 18234 16668 15736 14420
0.263 0.255
-9204.3408 -54252.323 -9139.1168 -54197.363
8659.75 5673.63 12181.65 3802.67
Yes Yes Yes Yes




0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tobit, CH
Price Cost Margin Number of Firms and 
Total Sales
Probit, CH Tobit, CH Probit, CH
2 χ
2 χ
Notes: The model includes the full set of control variables also used in the 
preceding model. Control variables for industry are introduced at the 2-
digit level. Standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit industry level, are 
shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%. 
In conclusion, the results presented above are robust to using different sample definitions, 
regression specifications, and estimation techniques. The finding that there is no effect of 
competition on training is not only restricted to establishments of the manufacturing sector but 
could also be confirmed for German establishments in the service sector.  
Conclusion
This paper provides a first attempt to test the implications of the theoretical model of 
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2006) empirically. Using data on German establishments for the 
years 2001, 2003 and 2005, the impact of market concentration on the probability to invest in 
training and on the number of workers trained is analyzed. Three measures for market 
concentration frequently used in the empirical literature are utilized: (1) the Herfindahl Index 
at the 3-digit industry level, (2) the number and total sales of competitors, i.e. firms operating 
within the same 3-digit industry, (3) price cost margins that represent the ratio of value added 
minus wage costs to total sales at the establishment level.  
When running the regressions for the Herfindahl Index, no significant correlation between 
market concentration and training is measured with or without introducing control variables. 
When using the number of firms as measure of competition without considering any control 
variables, a negative correlation between competition and training emerges. After including 
various controls, this effect reduces sharply but remains statistically significant. After 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, there is no direct effect of product market 
competition on training incidence or intensity. When using the price cost margin, there is no 
statistical significant effect in any of the regressions. In addition, the percentage of exports 
generated in international markets becomes insignificant after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity in all specifications. To the extent that export activity reflects another aspect of 
competition, the main result is strengthened once again. Even after running a variety of 
sensitivity analyses such as using several empirical specifications and estimation techniques, 
we cannot confirm a causal effect of competition on training for manufacturing 
establishments and establishments of the service sector. To sum up, the implications of the 
model of GS contradict with our empirical results. 18
Our finding that there is no impact of competition on training could be attributed to various 
reasons which will be discussed in the following. 
First, the crucial assumptions of positive but decreasing productivity gains of training could 
be violated. There is a large literature on productivity effects of training that find in the 
majority of cases a significant positive effect (Bartel 2000, Dearden et al. 2006, Zwick 2006). 
However, most of these papers use a linear functional form or introduce training measure(s) 
as binary variable(s). In addition, it is often assumed that there is a homogenous effect of 
productivity on training. Against the background of the importance of heterogeneity in terms 
of observables and unobservables for evaluating the returns to education (Carneiro et al. 
2001), it might be more realistic to assume that only those firms invest in training that have 
the highest expected returns. Hereafter, training does not increase productivity equally in all 
firms.  
Second, productivity gains might differ by the type of training provided. For example, there is 
some evidence that off-the-job training has a higher productivity enhancing effect than on-
the-job training (Black and Lynch 1996). Due to data limitations, our study focuses solely on 
rough training measures which are firms’ investment decisions and the number of employees 
that participate in further training. Thereby, outcome variables such as the amount spent in 
training and the purpose of training are not considered. Using more detailed training outcomes 
could yield different results.  
Finally, our analysis only provides results for the short-run effect of competition on training. 
Even if firms do recognize changes of market concentration rapidly, adapting their training 
behavior might be a longer lasting process. Training is still a new concept for firms with 
highly insecure returns that depend on the kind of training, the performance and ability of 
trained workers but also on the interaction of both. Using a longer panel data set, one could 
analyze whether there is an impact of competition on training investments in the long run. 
Even though our results conflict with the model of GS, their model is still tempting in that it 
combines labor market views with industrial economics. The model of GS emphasizes the 
role of firms to subsidize worker training and the role of product markets for firm’s training 
decisions. Their paper shows that the returns to training could differ between firms which 
could explain the large variation of training investments of German manufacturing 
establishments provided in this paper. There is evidence that the importance of training 
increased recently since the average number of establishments undertaking training 
investments increased since the beginning of the 90ies (Görlitz 2008). Hence, it is important 
to extend our knowledge from a theoretical and an empirical point of view on questions such 
as why firms train and why training investments differ between firms to such a large extent.  
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Appendix 
Table A- 1: Description of the Variables and Sample Statistics (Manufacturing Establishment) 
Variables Description Obs. Mean Min. Max.
Overall number of observations 12125
Training incidence Dummy is 1 if firms contributed financially to training 12103 0.63 0 1
Training intensity  Number of trained employees 10477 35.58 0 12963
HHI Herfindahl Index at 3-digit industry level (multiplied by 100) 11043 3.64 0.31 65.02
NOF Log of number of competitors at the 3-digit industry level 11783 8.36 1.95 12.40
SAL Log of total sales at 3-digit industry level (minus own sales) 10542 23.56 17.09 26.34
Price cost margin Price cost margin (in percentage points) 9589 22.21 -97.00 95.84
Share of sales with exports Share of sales generated in international markets 11721 16.32 0 100
Investments in ICT Dummy is 1 if investments in ICT 12074 0.58 0 1
Investments in real estate Dummy is 1 if investments in real estate 12074 0.19 0 1
Investments in machines Dummy is 1 if investments in machines 12074 0.63 0 1
Investments in logistics Dummy is 1 if investments in logistics/ transport systems 12074 0.25 0 1
Excellent state of techn. equipm. Dummy is 1 if technical equipment is excellent 12068 0.17 0 1
West Germany Dummy is 1 if West German establishment 12125 0.56 0 1
Apprenticeship Dummy is 1 if at least one apprentice at firm 12120 0.61 0 1
Work council Dummy is 1 if work council at firm 11725 0.43 0 1
Collective wage agreement Dummy is 1 if covered by collective wage agreement 12101 0.52 0 1
Fraction skilled white collar Share of white collar workers with university degree 12111 0.34 0 1
Fration skilled blue collar Share of blue collar workers with apprenticehip degree 12111 0.40 0 1
Separate enterprise  Dummy is 1 if separate enterprise/ single firm 11956 0.74 0 1
Headquarter Dummy is 1 if headquarter 11956 0.09 0 1
Subsidiary Dummy is 1 if subsidiary (or equivalent) 11956 0.17 0 1
Firm size Dummy equals 1 for firms of particular size:
   1-9    1-9 12125 0.22 0 1
   10-19    10-19 12125 0.12 0 1
   20-49    20-49 12125 0.18 0 1
   50-99    50-99 12125 0.12 0 1
   100-149    100-149 12125 0.07 0 1
   150-199    150-199 12125 0.05 0 1
   more than 200    more than 200 12125 0.24 0 1
Industry  Dummy equals 1 for firms in industry:
   Food products    Food products and tobacco (NACE 15-16) 12125 0.11 0 1
   Textiles and clothes    Textiles and clothes  (NACE 17-19) 12125 0.04 0 1
   Paper products    Paper products, Publishing, Printing (NACE 21-22) 12125 0.06 0 1
   Wood products    Wood products (NACE 20) 12125 0.06 0 1
   Chemical products    Chemical products  (NACE 24) 12125 0.06 0 1
   Rubber and plastic    Rubber and plastic (NACE 25) 12125 0.05 0 1
   Non-metical mineral products    Other Non-metical mineral products (NACE 26) 12125 0.06 0 1
   Basic metals    Basic metals (NACE 27) 12125 0.07 0 1
   Recycling    Recycling (NACE 37) 12125 0.01 0 1
   Fabricated metals    Fabricated metals except machinery (NACE 28) 12125 0.12 0 1
   Machinery and equipm.    Machinery and equipment (NACE 29) 12125 0.12 0 1
   Motor vehicles    Motor vehicles (NACE 34) 12125 0.05 0 1
   Other transport equipm.    Other transport equipment (NACE 35) 12125 0.02 0 1
   Electrical engineering    Electrical engineering (NACE 30-32) 12125 0.07 0 1
   Precission instruments    Medical, precission and optical instruments (NACE 33) 12125 0.06 0 1
   Manufacturing n.e.c.    Manufacturing n.e.c.(NACE 36) 12125 0.04 0 1
Year 2001 Dummy is 1 if year is 2001 12125 0.35 0 1
Year 2003 Dummy is 1 if year is 2003 12125 0.33 0 1
Year 2005 Dummy is 1 if year is 2005 12125 0.32 0 123
Table A- 2: Full Estimation Results for the Price Cost Margin 
Price Cost Margin -0.001 -0.031 0.000 0.138
Share of Sales with Exports 0.003** 0.654 0.003 0.674
Investments in ICT 0.368 *** 40.376 *** 0.206 *** 23.039 **
Investments in Real Estate 0.089 ** 30.324 ** 0.043 -3.326
Investments in Machines 0.200 *** 25.973 ** 0.094 18.329
Investments in Logistics 0.124 *** 26.082 0.073 1.556
Excellent State of Techn.  0.200 *** 28.763 ** 0.098 23.253
Equipm.
West Germany -0.121 *** -1.201 -0.137 *** -7.106
Apprenticeship 0.248 *** 34.684 ** 0.050 13.824
Work Council 0.223 *** 21.831 ** -0.130 -16.670
Collective Wage Agreement 0.199 *** 28.923 *** -0.019 -3.167
Fraction of Skilled White 0.761 *** 76.467 *** 0.110 66.316
Collar Employees
Fraction of Skilled Blue  0.459 *** 62.164 ** 0.190 127.035
Collar Employees
Firm, Size and Industry Controls
Year Controls
Mean Values for all Variables 
Wald  





Probit Probit, CH Tobit Tobit, CH
Yes No Yes No
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.0008) (0.1223) -0.0016 (0.2363)
(0.0012) (0.4270) (0.0028) (0.4294)
(0.0389) (15.3498) (0.0504) (10.7152)
(0.0396) (15.0874) (0.0597) (8.4367)
(0.0407) (10.3226) (0.0575) (9.4539)
(0.0389) (13.4504) (0.0498) (7.3918)
(0.0532) (12.4077) (0.0986) (14.5810)
(0.0432) (5.8762) (0.0427) (5.8404)
(0.0359) (13.5831) (0.0646) (11.8126)
(0.0582) (9.0435) (0.1202) (13.3903)
(0.0347) (9.9138) (0.0985) (11.6696)
(0.1062) (25.6818) (0.1893) (72.6294)
(0.1032) (29.3299) (0.1875) (103.0704)
3291.28   487.06  4253.97  797.83
-3975.31 -31972.14 -3946.71 -31950.396
0.320 0.325
8853 7716 8853 7716
2 χ
2 χ
Notes: The model includes dummy variables with 7 categories for size, 16 categories 
for industry and three binary variables for ‘firm’ indicating if the establishment is a 
single firm, subsidiary or headquarter. Standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit 
industry level, are shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%. 